In a brief concurrence, Justice Kennedy gave an impassioned
defense of free speech. He claimed that through this law, California sought “to
impose its own message in the place of individual speech, thought, and
expression.” Such an imposition, he continued, approached the most despotic of tendencies:
“history since [the founding] shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in
their attempts to stifle free speech.” We must “preserve and teach the
necessity of freedom of speech” as embodied in the first amendment, and we must
never allow the state “to force persons to express a message contrary to their
deepest convictions.” Strong stuff, indeed. Justice Kennedy here articulates the
standard liberal thesis that free speech stands at the center of a free society.
But, let’s not forget, Justice Kennedy is the swing vote on
today’s Court finding a constitutional
right to abortion! In other words, Justice Kennedy argues ferociously for
the free speech rights of pro-life activists, AND he argues ferociously that
those pro-life activists’ arguments should never be able to democratically succeed.
Sure, pro-life activists should be legally permitted to argue their case in the
public square. But even if those activists persuade a majority (or a
supermajority) of their fellows to oppose abortion, Justice Kennedy replies: “Too
bad. Abortion is here to stay no matter what a majority of the people or their representatives
might want.”
I complained in my previous
post about campus free speech arguments that suffer from a similar fault. On
a college campus, the best argument for free speech is “I might learn something
new.” In a democratic society, the best argument for free speech is “we might
learn something new.”
To be clear, I’m not especially bullish on free speech. I
find Millian “marketplace-of-ideas” arguments highly suspect, and I think there
are plenty
of good reasons to question a regime of largely untrammeled free
expression. But IF there are decisive arguments in favor of free speech, “this
is a useful way for free societies to arrive at democratic decisions” must be
pre-eminent among them.
Of course, other arguments are often given. We might defend
the sacred right of the white supremacist to defend slavery, even as our
constitution prohibits a majority of voters from every re-instituting the
practice. (Personally, I find such arguments thoroughly uninteresting). So there is no necessary contradiction in Justice Kennedy’s position.
But it points us, frankly, to a silliness endemic in contemporary liberal
discourse. It is difficult to take seriously a romantic defense of free and
open expression that reduces to: “Believe what you want, argue your convictions,
debate and persuade others of your view! But remember, no matter how many
people you convince in the marketplace of ideas, there’s nothing you can ever
do to change the law.”